



TOP SECRET



Briefing conducted by Lt. Colonel Pete Jones, 74th FS.

06:30, 14th March, 2012.

## Media

<https://youtu.be/YYAG8VL7EoM>

## Situation

It's been 4 months since the friendly fire incident at Mt. Kharman. The investigation into this incident has been completed and Flt. Lt. Hill has been cleared of any wrongdoing, the lack of clear lines of communication between the SF teams and ASOC over troop deployments was highlighted as the primary contributing factor. This incident however served to damage an already tenuous relationship with the 'New Dawn's Promise' militia.

Flt. Lt. Hill has been on ground duties at Al Dhafra whilst the investigation was undertaken but is now cleared to return to frontline duty. He returns to a radically different Iran. In the 4 months he has been assigned to Al Dhafra the coalition achieved it's goal of reaching Tehran and with the support of an uprising in the city, ousted the Iranian leadership. Most of Iran is now under the control of coalition forces. A transitional government, representative of the people, was installed ahead of planned elections later this year but a number of significant issues still persist within Iran. The new government has been relatively well received by the majority of Iranians, but there are a number of groups who have challenged their legitimacy and taken up arms in small scale insurgencies across the country.


However these insurgencies pale in significance to the large insurgency underway in the Zagros mountains. It is in this region that a significant number of IRGC forces retreated in the face of the coalition assault and went underground, the IRGC are embedded within the towns and villages in this region from which they conduct attacks on coalition forces and supporters of the new Iranian government.

The centre of US activity has now shifted to the city of Shiraz. The international airport now houses a substantial force of US and UK aircraft and is key to the ongoing operations against IRGC forces in the Zagros mountains. Shiraz itself has so far been


## Situation

relatively free of insurgent incidents, supported no doubt by a heavy military presence on the ground and checkpoints into the city on all major routes.

Although the IRGC insurgency is spread throughout the region, the city of Yasuj is clearly the centre of their operations. Early patrols into this city after the start of the insurgency met exceptionally heavy resistance, it is estimated that up to 20,000 fighters might be present in this city alone. The presence of civilians in the city and IRGC air defences that escaped the coalition assault have complicated the situation. As such Yasuj is currently considered a no go area and the focus is on containing the threat from the forces in this city whilst securing the surrounding region.



# Situation





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## SPINS

Command and Control:

Local ATC will be responsible for all airspace control within 10nm of their respective airfields.

UAE airspace is currently closed to almost all civilian traffic and all airspace movement in the UAE / Gulf region will be controlled from E-3 platforms under the callsign **Overlord**.

Once handed off by ATC, coalition aircraft must report to Overlord who to ensure aircraft deconfliction will assign altitude blocks in high traffic areas.

All communications channels should be monitored as listed in the mission briefing at all times.



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## SPINS

Rules of Engagement.

### Aircraft Classifications

**Bandit** - Aircraft identified as belonging to a hostile force.

**Bogey** - Unidentified aircraft.

**Friendly** - Aircraft identified as belonging to a friendly force.

**Unknown** - An unknown aircraft, presumed friendly.

### Hostile Intent

Hostile Act considered if unit:

- Engages friendly forces with a weapons system.

OR

- Supports the weapons systems of other units, resulting in weapons release. Including but not limited to lasing, marking, radar illumination of targets.

Hostile Act considered if unit meets **all** the conditions below:

- Spikes/spots/marks a friendly target within their weapons range or the range of a supporting unit.
- Persistently maneuvers to maintain a weapons firing solution or to maintain solution for fire support.
- PosID as a bandit or belonging to a hostile force.

Hostile Act considered if unit meets **all** the conditions below:

- Moves in an aggressive manner towards friendly forces.
- Actively deploys countermeasures and/or seeks to avoid detection.
- PosID as a bandit or belonging to a hostile force.



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## SPINS

### Rules of Engagement.

Hostile Act considered if unit meets **any** of the conditions below:

(note these conditions may often apply to individuals that are civilian in appearance)

- Observed preparation of an ambush position, including but not limited to the positioning of weapons systems, explosives or significant obstructions in tactically advantageous positions.
- PosID as engaging in the command and control of hostile forces.
- Observed in the use, transportation or maintenance of weapons systems that pose a threat to coalition forces within a contested battlespace.

Upon confirmation of a hostile act, aircrew are cleared to engage and act in self defence or the defence of friendly forces.

### Predefined targets

Targets defined within a briefing are pre-cleared for engagement providing the briefed details are followed. In these conditions visual ID will not be required.

### Dynamic Targets

Targets may be assigned to aircrew via ASOC or JTAC in the field.

Weapons release authority will be under the control of the JTAC/AFAC at all times. The only exception to this is if contact with JTAC/AFAC is lost and that in the defence of friendly forces the conditions for hostile intent can be met.

### Surrendered Forces

The surrender of all forces must be observed and engagement ceased immediately.

If soldiers abandon a vehicle and move away from the battlefield in a manner consistent with surrender they must be allowed to escape to a safe distance before engaging the vehicle. Surrender should be distinguished from retreat, surrender is defined as the abandonment of all weapons/ weapons systems and overt actions such as white flags, raised hands.



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Control of Air Support.

Air support requests (ASR) will commonly be made through the ground commander CAS to the air support operations center (ASOC).

The ASOC will process the ASR and match to available CAS platforms. ASOC will direct the CAS platform to the AO and connect them to the JTAC / AFAC.

The JTAC or AFAC will provide the targets details, locations of friendly forces or civilians and specify the attack details such as IP, attack direction, weapons to be employed and egress routes. The JTAC will also specify the type of control authority they will have over the attack, these are detailed as below:

### *Type 1*

JTAC requires control of individual attacks and must visually acquire the attacking aircraft and the target for each attack. Targets and friendly positions should be marked whenever possible.

Visual acquisition must be obtained through eyes-on or via optics such as binoculars, without the use of third party devices such as laptops or other digital imagery.

Control will be made over the attack direction of the aircraft to reduce the risk of collateral damage or the attack affecting friendly forces.

### *Type 2*

JTAC requires control of individual attacks but JTAC is unable to visually acquire the attacking aircraft at weapons, unable to visually acquire the target, or the attacking aircraft is unable to acquire the mark/target prior to weapons release.

JTAC can acquire the target visually or use targeting data from a scout, fire support team, joint fires observer, unmanned aircraft (UA), special operations forces, CAS aircrew, or other asset with accurate real-time targeting information.



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## SPINS

Control of Air Support.

### *Type 3*

JTAC provides clearance for multiple attacks within a single engagement subject to specific attack restrictions.

JTAC does not need to visually acquire the aircraft or the target.

JTAC will provide attacking aircraft with targeting restrictions and then grant blanket weapons release clearance to meet the stated restrictions.

JTAC maintains abort authority.

### *9 Lines*

The JTAC will commonly provide the CAS platform with a 9 line specifying the instructions for the attack. The 9 line format is as follows.

1. Initial point (IP)
2. Heading from the IP to the target.
3. Distance from the IP to the target in nautical miles.
4. Target elevation in feet above mean sea level.
5. Target description.
6. Target location coordinates.
7. Type of mark.
8. Location of friendlies from the target, direction, and distance in meters.
9. Egress direction.





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## SPINS

### *Terminology*

The JTAC and air support platform will communicate using set terminology. This terminology is detailed here.

*Cleared hot* - air support is cleared to engage the target.

*Winter* - this is the predetermined abort code in theatre. If the JTAC issues code winter or calls abort then the attacking aircraft must safety weapons systems and maneuver off target.

*Contact* - refers to spotting visual references used to talk onto a target.

*Tally* - Visual confirmation by the pilot of the target.

*Visual*- Visual confirmation of friendly forces.

## Weather

Wind = 245 7kn @ GL, 117 10Kn @ 6600, 243 55Kn @26000.

Temp 23C.

Clouds 7/10, base 7800 feet, 2500 feet depth.



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## Mission

### Mission Summary:

- Conduct an airborne alert patrol northwest of Shiraz.

### Mission Details

Gunman 2-1 will take-off from Shiraz International Airport and join up with Gunman 1-1 at WP1.

Gunman 1-1 will lead Gunman 2-1 on an airborne alert patrol through a route northwest of Shiraz. Overlord will handle the coordination of any requests for tasking.

Upon completion of the tasking/patrol route the flight will return to Shiraz and land.

### Mission Specifics

The IRGC insurgents have been extremely active in the areas northwest of Shiraz and our patrols in this area have come under regular ambushes and IED attacks. The region is now under constant 24 hour airborne patrol from our A-10 squadrons, with further assets on ground alert at all times as well.

The IRGC have primarily engaged our forces with asymmetric tactics, using hit and run attacks and IEDs. However they do still possess some light armour, older mobile SAMs and a significant number of AAA and MANPAD systems, equipment that appears to have escaped the wholesale destruction of the Iranian military.

Refer to your kneeboard for the comms plan, units in the field should reference this plan.

Overlord will act as the coordinating agency for air support requests.

## Flight Plan

WP	Alt (k ft)	IAS (Kn)	Notes	WP	Alt (k ft)	IAS (Kn)	Notes
1	10	230	RV Gunman 3-1	5	20	230	
2	20	230		6	20	230	
3	20	230		7	10	230	APPROACH
4	20	230	Caution - Yasuj north	8			Land

Joker Fuel 1500lb

Bingo Fuel 1000lb





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## Threats

Yasuj should not be approached. SATINT and ELINT have revealed an extremely heavy presence of AAA in the city along with a number of SA-8 and one SA-6 system.

Away from Yasuj the usual precautions against mobile AAA and MANPADs should be taken.